As demonstrated in a recent book by Portugali (1999) , our view as regards the development of settlements and cities is undergoing a paradigm change. Whereas formerly the concept of planning or imposed organization occupied a preeminent position in practical and scientific work, we now tend to consider the growth of settlements and cities in terms of self-organization. In the present context, self-organization by no means suggests the absence of any planning in the city (Schaur, 1992) but rather implies several parallel planning processes: each of the many agents operating in the cityöindividuals, households, firms, or government agenciesöcan be viewed as urban planner' at a certain scale. Hence self-organization in the city reflects the cooperative structuralization and organization of these many plans at individual scales. Consequently, the issue of decisionmaking at these various scales becomes central to the understanding of the dynamics of cities (compare also Allen and Sanglier, 1981) .
In the present paper we wish to contribute further to the synergetic approach by studying the interplay between decisionmaking of agents at local scales and collective optimization at a scale of the city as a whole. To this end we develop a mathematical model dealing with the occupation of flats by people. Such a model may be of particular interest to countries that experience fast urbanization or, for example, large immigration. We assume that a certain distribution of urban units (flats, offices, etc) is available and that these units have a specific attractiveness to various agents (individuals, households, firms, etc) . For the sake of simplicity we focus on individuals and households in their search for flats, keeping in mind, however, that our approach is also applicable to other urban land uses. In doing so, we may attribute an attractiveness parameter of a specific flat to a specific customer. The problem to be solved then is to find an occupation that contains the highest total attractiveness. This situation can of course also include various conflicts: for example, one flat may seem equally attractive to two or more customers, but only one of them can occupy it, whereas the others will have to settle for a less attractive flat.
In fact, the problem of flat occupation can be related to the so-called`assignment problem' in discrete optimization, where, for instance, jobs are assigned to machines in a factory. In this case, the total costs are minimized, or, in other words, the efficiency is maximized. Historically, this latter problem was usually solved by the use of specific discrete algorithms. A first important step towards a transformation of this problem into one tractable by methods of synergetics has been made by Starke (1997;  see also Haken et al, 1999; Starke et al, 1999) , who showed that the concepts of so-called synergetic computers can be extended to the assignment problem. Recall that the synergetic computer (Haken, 1991) employs a profound analogy between pattern formation and pattern recognition. The formation of patterns can often be described as a competition process between several macroscopic structures whose contribution to the actual state is quantified by order parameters. One of those structures finally wins the competition by suppressing the others, resulting in a specific globally coherent macroscopic state. Interpreting these structures as prototypical patterns of stored data, an equivalent competition of the corresponding order parameters dynamically classifies an initial state (for example, a presented test pattern) by complementing its best-fitting prototype. Put differently, such a system obtains information from partially given input features, that is, it acts as associative memory applicable for pattern recognition (for details, see Haken, 1991) . In a similar sense, Starke considered specific assignments as patterns that strive for an optimal solution. That is, the competition between the corresponding order parameters yields an optimal global state. In Starke's approach, however, the realization of an explicit assignment depends exclusively on initial conditions for the selection process that finally determines the resulting costs. A decisive step further was taken by Haken (1998) who included the cost or attractiveness functions in the differential equations that describe the development of the assignment or occupation. Indeed, the formalism we shall describe below is based on this approach which was in fact suggested for the treatment of decisionmaking in the context of cities.
Below we will show how the attempts of individuals at local and global optimization evolve simultaneously. On the one hand, by our construction of the process, the system tends to acquire its globally optimal state. On the other hand, the individuals try to make decisions, so as to optimize their own (local) attractiveness function. Each decision must, however, be made in the presence of actions of all other individuals. Thus we are confronted with a highly cooperative effect in which basically all people compete. We shall see how the individual path from a yet undecided state of a person changes into a final realization. As can be shown, the identical global optimal values can be achieved by different realizations of occupancy. It also turns out that the time at which a decision is made plays an important role.
The model
In this section we formulate our model mathematically, and essentially follow Haken (1998) . We shall distinguish persons or families by an index i, i 1, ... , N, whereas the index j, j 1, ... , M, is used to distinguish between different flats. The actual state of the system is then given by a set of abstract variables x i j , each bounded at values between 0 and 1: x i j 0 corresponds to the situation in which person i does not occupy flat j. A value of x i j that is larger than 0 but smaller than 1 is interpreted as person i expecting to occupy flat j . One may quantify the degree of expectation of the probability of occupancy by x 2 i j . If the flat is then actually occupied, x i j acquires the value x i j 3 1önote that x i j are positive values so that x i j and x 2 i j are more or less interchangable when interpreting these quantities. In a sense, x i j describes the affiliation of the person to a certain flat, or vice versa. Assuming that a flat can be occupied only by a single person (or family) and every person can fill at most one flat, then the evolution of every x i j 3 x i j (t ) should reach a steady state:
The constants a, b, c, ... denote the affinity between each person and the flat he or she has reached. That is, an optimization implies a specific distribution of affinity levels that are described by real scalars and tend to a, b, c, ... % 1 for the desired state and vanish otherwise [compare with equation (6) below]. Thus, given a specific optimization, some people are more or less satisfied with their situation. The more satisfied ones will strive for stability and the less satisfied will try to change, which may lead tò spatial-cognitive' dissonances in the housing market (Portugali, 1999; Portugali et al, 1997 ). An equivalent situation has already been studied in the context of attachments of houses to a given fixed spatial environment, for example, a two-dimensional square lattice. By introducing`efficiency' parameters k i j Haken (1998) described this attachment problem in terms of an optimization task. Explicitly, a (least square) potential U(fx i j g) i j k i j x 2 i j has to be maximized with respect to x i j resulting in the most efficient solution for the assignment i 6 j. In general, however, such an optimization does not have a unique solution so that it is helpful to define some a priori restrictions on the solution space. For the sake of convenience, one first bounds i x 2 i j 1 and j x 2 i j 1, that is, the values of x i j remain finite and do not dissipate. Further, to provide certain solutions of the aforementioned form
These boundary conditions are added to the negative least square potential ÀU by the use of Lagrange multipliers L k (Haken, 1998) leading to a form
The minimization of V is realized in terms of a gradient dynamics so that all states x i j evolve according to
the dot denotes the derivative with respect to time, x i j dx i j adt. The stable steady states x i j 0 of dynamics (3) correspond to the minima of V and therefore to the maxima of U.
To point out the various impacts of the different parameters, we reformulate the dynamics (3) with
, and À2k i j X aC i j , and obtain
In equation (4) a, b are positive real constants and the parameters C i j describe positive or negative`costs'. The latter are strongly related to the efficiency values k i j in equation (2). Note that we assume 1 5 1 À aC i j 5 0. Hence the larger the value of C i j , the less attractive flat j becomes for subject i. Basically the two sums in equation (4) describe competition processes between the x i j : the first pinpoints index i, the second index j. Consequently, persons and flats are distinguished from each other, yielding steady states whose preference is given by some minimal costs C i j . The single cubic term x 3 i j guarantees that all x i j (t 3 I) remain bounded as time progresses. As equation (4) represents a gradient dynamics according to equation (3), one is tempted to visualize the evolution by its corresponding potential landscape defined in equation (2). That is, the evolution of the system may be viewed as the movement of a ball that rolls in an overdamped fashion along the landscape V(fx i j g) to its closest minimum. Equation (4), however, describes two simultaneously evolving competition processes (both between subjects and between flats), that is, the entire, at least four-dimensional, dynamics cannot be visualized as a whole. With regard to this multidimensionality we therefore depict the evolution only within two-dimensional subspaces. In figures 1^3 each flat is located at a valley representing a local attractor for every subject.
With appropriate initial conditions x i j (t 0) the subjects will not interfere with each other and, as a result of the competition between the flats j, each subject will select one j 0 (figure 1). However, when the subjects come close to each other, they will be attracted by the same flat. This situation occurs very often if the flats differ considerably in cost so that one or a very few flats remain significantly more attractive
Figure 1. Evolution of two x i j in a`potential' landscape. Each minimum of this landscape represents an attractive flat j 0 for every person i. Under sufficient initial conditions each subject (ball) will relax to its closest minimum (flat) without interfering with one another.
than the others. For instance, if for some j the parameters C i j are very small, then the corresponding minima will become deeper and their basin of attraction is enlarged (figure 2). On the other hand, the closer the subjects the more they compete with each other. Accordingly, they repel each other so that for one subject the former low-cost flat becomes unattractive. When we visualize this evolution the costs of a certain flat are effectively increased because of the competition between subjects (see figure 3).
Figure 2. Evolution of two x i j that are close to each other. Both systems will relax to the same minimal point. Here, this minimum corresponds to a flat with low cost value, that is, the minimum is deeper than the minimum of the neighbor. This effective change in the shape of the potential should not, however, be taken too literally because we can only sketch this shape in two-dimensional subspaces. Indeed, the potential is highly degenerated as shown in appendix A. Nevertheless, various aspects of the dynamics can be easily viewed such as the flat 6 subject attraction as well as its effective variation owing to the subject 6 subject (or flat 6 flat) competition. More general effects can, however, be discussed in terms of numerical simulations.
Simulation
To show the major properties of the dynamics especially in the case of large populations we integrate the system for N 20 subjects and M 60 flats with fixed parameters a 0X5 and b 50. Initial conditions and cost parameters C i j are both varied to study their impacts on the evolution. The latter are typically chosen in such a way that we have two or three different sets of flats: expensive, average, and cheap. Accordingly, we expect solutions in which, if possible, only the cheap flats will be occupied whereas the expensive ones remain vacant. Because the dynamics is N6M 1200-dimensional, we define a sufficient data reduction in terms of an appropriate visualization. Concentrating on the dynamics of the subjects we combine the indices j and project each x i j onto a two-dimensional plane. To define this projection we consider the expected stationary states of the form in expression (1), that is, x i j G d ii 0 d j j 0 . These solutions can be verified by inserting x i j 0 in equation (4), resulting in
For the second equation in set (5) we further insert the ansatz x i j g i j d i i 0 d j j 0 , so that the two sums vanish:
Note that the values g i j correspond to a, b, c, ... in equation (1). Given such steady states we rescale each x i j by g i j and use as projection
Thus every flat j is located along the unit circle at an angle a j and each subject's evolution is given as trajectory x i (t), y i (t)] (see colour figure 1 ). To stress the dynamical aspects and to be able to locate areas of competition we further use time t as the third dimension (for instance, areas where the two states x i j approach each other in colour figure 2).
To discuss the properties of the settlement dynamics (4) let us start by focusing on what is certainly the most important characteristic of the system, that is, the selection and occupation of the flats with lowest costs. Suppose all subjects have more or less equal starting positions from which they have to create their optimal path. In other words, all subjects initially have comparable affinities to the flats. Hence, if we respect the mapping defined in equation (7), all subjects are located close to the origin when they start to move. Note that the evolution is a deterministic process so that two or more states with identical values will always follow the same evolution. To avoid such a scenario we choose the initial conditions as V i j X x i j (t 0 x 0 dx i j , where dx i j have small equally distributed bounded random values (jdx i j j 4 10 À4 x 0 . In other words, initially all the subjects are at a random but finite distance without any preference to a certain location. The resulting evolution is shown in colour figure 2 for the case in which the flats have three different cost values C i j (most of the flats are expensive, some others are cheap, and a few are even cheaper). At the beginning all subjects tend to the flats with lowest cost values and stay very close to each other [initial shift of all trajectories to the right-hand side in colour figure 2(a) ]. This initial trend is figure 1) . The trajectories show the subjects' paths over time t. Plots (b) and (c) are projected sections of the evolution focusing on the time intervals that include the decision process. With similar initial values all x i j t) stay close for quite some time and tend to the flats with lowest costs (right-hand side). Then they split in two steps (b,c) and reach the low-cost flats (see text); light-green flats, C i j 0X2; dark-green flats, C i j 0X4; red flats, C i j 0X8. Note that the radial scale is nonlinear (r 1a3 ) to magnify the area of discrimination close to the origin. followed by a first discrimination step after which the flats with the lowest cost values become occupied [colour figure 2(b)]. The remaining subjects redirect to flats with the next lower cost values, compete for a while [colour figure 2(c)], and finally they split to occupy one flat each.
Thus, with almost identical and unbiased starting positions, the dynamics results in a unique detection and optimal occupation of flats in terms of a solution of the form given by expression (1). The cost parameters C i j act as dynamical constraints for the selection process, that is, they determine which flats will be occupied. The explicit assignment between subjects and preferred flats, however, remains random [dependent on the initial distances x i j (t 0)] because the dynamics allows for arbitrary individual permutations.
In the next step we enhance the conflicting situation by favoring a certain flat j 0 . [Respecting the impacts of the costs of flats, we realize this new emphasis in terms of initial distances.] Apparently, the smaller the distance between a specific subject and a flat the more likely it is that this flat will be occupied by that subject because the latter will be more attracted to it. Thus, to generate an initial bias to one flat j 0 , we choose x i j 0 (t 0) x 0 i , that is, all subjects have an initial trend or minimal distance to that flat. The affiliation to all other flats j T j 0 is lower, that is,
As shown in colour figure 3 successive discrimination processes can resolve this conflict given that x i j (t 0) differ for each pair (i, j) (note that all x 0 i and x 0 j differ, that is, the subjects are lined up in direction of flat j 0 ; see below). Although for all subjects their individual distances are minimal for the flat j 0 , which, in addition, is very attractive owing to its low cost value [colour figure 3(a)], the subjects switch to alternatives after one individual i 0 has won the initial competition [yellow trajectory at the right-hand side of colour figure 3(a) ]. Despite the nearness of the attractive area [right-hand side in colour figure 3(a)], at first all subjects move from there owing to the competition between themselves (the individuals are too busy with the competition and do not realize the optimal direction). After a while the subject i 0 which was initially closest reaches the optimal flat. The alternatives open to the others include flats with higher cost values owing to the effective change in the actual potential (compare with figure 3) . But in the course of time the low-cost flats are detected and occupied, as in colour figure 2.
We now treat the case in which all starting positions differ from each other because the evolution is a deterministic process. As already indicated above, in the absence of additional fluctuations two or more states that have identical (initial) values will always follow the same route. Put differently, in the case of equal values the entire system will reach any stationary point, irrespective of whether it is a minimum or a saddle point of the potential (therefore we used individually different x consequently, becomes a stochastic differential equation (1) given by
G i j t) is assumed to be d-correlated Gaussian noise with a vanishing mean, that is, hG i j (t)i 0 and
. This additional stochasticity can be interpreted as intrinsic variability or flexibility of subjects (and flats). Even in a steady state each individual remains somewhat fuzzy, or he or she is always attempting to explore his 
Colour figure 7. Evolution of x i j . Given the same parameter settings as in colour figure 4, the number of low-cost flats is smaller than the number of subjects. Thus, only a few can find optimal solutions whereas the remaining ones randomly choose other flats.
(1) The integration of equation (8) is realized with an Euler-forward method (step size Dt 4 10 À3 ). For further details on the mathematics see, for example, Hu Gang et al (1996) , Kim and Sung (1998), and Mannella (1989). or her neighborhood. As an immediate consequence, we can now allow for identical initial conditions because the permanent fluctuations guarantee that two states will never remain the same [contrast with equation (4); see also Bressloff and Roper, 1998 ]. Colour figure 4 (page 97) shows the evolution in the case of equal nonvanishing values x i j (t 0) x 0 which is basically comparable with colour figure 2. Subjects, whose starting positions agree exactly, split and find an optimal and low-cost flat. Apart from the possibility for such identical initial values, the additional randomness accelerates the discrimination. Hence, an increase in individual flexibility or variability supports the solution of conflicts or competitions.
For the totally unbiased initial state x 0 0, however, we expect a very competitive situation (see colour figure 5 , page 97). The complete absence of any initial preference means that the initial fluctuations assume great importance. In fact, the very first random step can generate such a large distance between a subject and the flats with low costs that flats with much higher costs will be occupied. The dynamics can reach stationary states at local minima, that is, the subjects cannot find the globally optimal solution (colour figure 5) because it is beyond their horizon. In principle, the possibility of existence of these spurious states can be reduced by methods that adjust the noise strengths depending on the actual state of the system (for example, simulated annealing). For instance, if a subject is trapped in an unwanted local minimum its fluctuation strength can be increased to enable an escape from that valley. Metaphorically one might say that this subject has to become more flexible and has to look behind the wall that surrounds him or her. (2) Another interesting feature of our model follows from a further enhancement of conflicts. For this purpose, we again modify the initial values in analogy with colour figure 3 but avoid preference for any flat other than j 0 . That is, we take V i j T j 0 X x i j (t 0) 0 by which all subjects will only try to reach flat j 0 [see colour figure 6(b)]. The enormous task to differentiate this dominating initial trend towards flat j 0 can no longer be managed by the competition between subjects. Consequently, various flats become occupied by more than one subject. Again, the systems are trapped in local minima which now correspond to some flat-sharing communities. This solution can, however, be avoided by an increase in the parameter b that denotes the competition strength between the subjects.
So far, we have always assumed that the number of low-cost flats is identical to the number of subjects. As shown above, the entire system typically relaxes into its optimal state. The question arises of what happens in the case in which the number of low-cost flats is smaller than the number of subjects wanting to occupy them. With our previous results the answer to that question can be found immediately: the low-cost flats will become occupied. As there is no additional preference for the other flats, the remaining subjects will choose one of the more expensive solutions, as shown in colour figure 7. Interestingly, after the initial rapid occupation of the low-cost flats, the subsequent decision process requires a relatively long time. The subjects who cannot find a free low-cost solution decide to go to randomly chosen, less preferable flats. Thus they have many more opportunities and the decision process is longer. In a sense, the final states are still optimal because they are steady.
At first sight, the phenomenon of double or even multiple occupancy of flats noted above seems to be in conflict with our mathematical model which in its original formulation excludes such cases. It should be noted, however, that this rigorous , (2) Subjects in unwanted locations are motivated to expand their information field from`local' tò mezo' and`global'. This, however, requires more extended mathematical modeling. As the application of such techniques is rather time-consuming, we will treat this problem explicitly in forthcoming works. constraint was replaced by the introduction of a cost function, with which, in principle, multiple occupancy is compatible. In practice, this means that the cost function represents an additional burden to people because of multiple occupancy.
The reality of cities indicates that`multiple occupancy' can take at least three basic forms: flat sharing, flat repartition, and`squatting'. In the first form, several individuals or families share a flat that was designed originally for a single person or a family. This solution is typical of, for example, the`guest workers' community at the center in Tel Aviv and similar cases in other cities. Consequently, the poorest people live on the most expensive land at the center of the city. The second solution, repartition, impliesöas the name indicatesöthat a single flat is subdivided into two or more flats. This typifies processes of gentrification, for example, where`yuppies' are prepared to pay high prices for relatively small flats at the center of the city. The third solution is common in many developing countries in which the poor people, who immigrate to major cities, cannot afford to buy or rent flats of the required size. Hence they squat in vacant areas in between residential areas, often in or near the center of the city. Note that each of these solutions implies a structural change in the city: the flat sharing and the squatting solutions lead to a change in the sociocultural spatial composition of the city, and the repartition solution leads to a change in structure of its housing stock.
Conclusion
In the present paper we suggest a model that covers decisionmaking processes of persons during their search for a flat. Decisions basically result from competition between persons and between flats and typically lead to globally optimal occupation distributions. Even though this model should be viewed as a top-down approach because we start off with the evolution of order parameters x i j we have taken a first step towards the underlying`microlevel' by introducing cost functions that are interpreted in terms of affinity levels. In general, however, order parameters have to be considered as complex macroscopic variables, in this case by means of affiliations between persons and flats. Affiliation is of course an intrinsic feature describing the relationship between flats and persons. Focusing on the person, one may therefore say that the dynamics of the order parameters shows the evolution of the person's intrinsic or`mental' maps when solving the problem of flat occupationönote that the dynamics does not necessarily distinguish between evolving persons and evolving flats, but we consider the persons to be the actors rather than the flats. In this sense, each variable x i j describes an internal map which is linked to the expectation of person i to find flat j. Owing to the dynamical representation we can therefore follow up the change of these mental maps over time leading from uncertainty to certainty. It might be a challenge to link our approach with approaches of action theory, which is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
A number of general conclusions can be drawn from our approach. For an individual it seems to be important to make his or her decision early enough in the case of conflicts. Although in a number of cases the collective of people finds an optimal solution, there are various instances in which the collective solution is suboptimal. There is a delicate interplay between the values of the attractiveness function and the constraints as expressed by the terms of the potential function that contains the Lagrange parameters. It is interesting to see what happens if these constraints are made weaker by lowering the values of the Lagrange parameters. As noted above, in such a case, multiple occupancy, repartition, or squatting will be allowed ösituations which are quite possible in overcrowded cities. Here, our model is only a first step towards a more comprehensive approach connecting mental maps of individuals with global patterns of occupancy.
The sequential nature of the decisionmaking process in the model is closely related to the Haken and Portugali conceptualization of decisionmaking in the context of SIRN [synergetic interrepresentation networks (Portugali, 1999 ; see also Haken and Portugali, 1996; Portugali, 1996) ]. According to the latter, each decisionmaking agent in the city is subject to two forms of input information:`internal', or from the mind; and`external', or from the city. Their interaction gives rise to an order parameter that can be interpreted as the cognitive map according to which the agent takes its location decision in the city. The action that follows this decision changes the city, which in turn affects the agent's cognitive map [compare with`circular causality' (Haken, 1991; ]. In the next step of our research, we intend to integrate the model developed here with the SIRN model and add to it an explicit consideration of the urban space. That is, we will attempt to include neighborhood relations in the attractiveness functions.
